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THE FEDERALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF
PUBLIC CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW IN THE




The public law of consumer protection in the United States is a
mess. As a result, the effectiveness of litigation and other methods to
enforce those laws is in jeopardy. This has occurred because those
who decide the country's public policy on consumer protection are
torn between two opposing perspectives. On the one hand,
policymakers strive to preserve freedom of contract and a
marketplace unburdened by the costs that result from government
agencies and individuals enforcing strong consumer laws. Under this
free market model, favored by the business community, consumers
are responsible for their actions, and "free" to enter into bad deals,
including contracts that take away their right to resolve disputes in
court. Consumers should be able to sue companies only for breach of
contract and common law fraud in individual, not class, actions.
Government regulation that protects consumers should be kept to a
minimum, and should be enacted and enforced by the federal
government rather than the states so companies do not have to
comply with fifty different state laws.
On the other hand, policymakers have tried to respond to persistent
practices by exploitative merchants and creditors who often target
those consumers who are most vulnerable: the elderly, the sick, the
poor, and the uneducated. This article describes the current state of
the public law that has resulted, focusing on enforcement of that law
by government agencies and litigation pursuant to that law. As used
in this article, public consumer protection law refers to those laws
that are intended to protect the public as a whole, not just to provide
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rules for deciding private disputes.' These laws typically authorize
government agencies to promulgate regulations and enforce the law.2
Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many
consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual
consumers also can litigate violations of these laws. Many of these
laws also provide class actions and statutory damages which
encourage consumers to act as "private attorneys general."3
Reflecting the principle of federalism that is a long-standing national
tradition, federal statutes often include provisions that generally
preempt state law but permit states to have laws that are more
protective than the federal law.
There is great variation among consumer protection laws, however,
because each law deals with a specific matter, and deals with it in its
own somewhat unique way. The law varies depending on whether a
transaction involves credit cards or debit cards, home mortgage loans
or loans not secured by a personal residence, heavily regulated
financial institutions such as banks or loosely regulated institutions
such as companies that cash checks. There is no uniformity and no
consistency among the various consumer protection laws and how
they are enforced because there is no national consensus on what
laws are necessary to protect consumers and who should enforce
those laws.
The development of public consumer law in the United States
differs significantly from the approach of the European Union where
there is a modicum of consensus and uniformity. 4 The trend in the
United States since the 1980s has been to rely less on statutes and
1. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). In contrast, "private"
law consists primarily of the obligations, allocation of risks, liability, and remedies provided in the
parties' contract. Enforcement is limited to an action for breach of the duties imposed by the contract.
Government agencies do not police these contracts.
2. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (2000).
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (permitting class actions). Statutes typically impose restrictions on consumer
class actions to prevent them from forcing a company into bankruptcy. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(2)(B) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (2000) (providing statutory damages).
4. Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S. Business-
To-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 214 (2007); Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix,
Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 183
(2006).
[Vol. 24:663
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regulations to protect consumers and increasingly on litigation to
enforce the laws enacted in the 1960s and 1970s, and "economic
regulation" to foster market competition. 5 The European Union, in
contrast, has taken a "social regulation" approach, treating consumer
protection as one aspect of its duty to protect public health and
safety.6 Therefore, the goal of consumer legislation in the European
Union is to make markets safe for consumers. Regulatory agencies
take the lead in enforcing consumer laws, rather than litigation.
7
Two increasingly robust developments receive special attention in
this article because they pose serious threats to the viability of
effective enforcement of the public law of consumer protection. One
development is the federalization of consumer law. The prime
example is preemption of state law by federal agencies. That type of
preemption often negates aggressive state law protection and replaces
it with lax federal enforcement. 8 The second is the privatization of
consumer law, primarily through mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.
Arbitration privatizes the justice system, hiding litigation involving
consumers from government review. Arbitration also stymies
effective and efficient consumer enforcement by banning class
actions. In addition, privatization has occurred in payment system
law, where a private organization has issued the rules that govern
many aspects of the electronic transfer of funds.
The consumer protection laws discussed in this article are those
involving consumer sales, payment, and credit transactions. Part I
describes several of the major federal statutes and regulations that
govern the consumer marketplace. This is followed by a description
of how government agencies enforce that law. Part II describes some
of the laws the states have enacted to protect consumers, the federal
agency preemption battles that have erupted as a result, and the effect
of preemption on litigation and enforcement. Part III focuses on
5. Winn & Webber, supra note 4, at 212-13.
6. Id. at 212. Several other countries have adopted a similar approach, including Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan. Id.
7. Id. at 213.
8. The term "preemption" also is used in relation to federal statutes that preempt state law. Federal
agencies that preempt state law base that action on alleged authority to do so in federal statutes.
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litigation brought by consumers, describing some victories as well as
defeats, and what they reveal about the development of consumer
protection law. Part IV examines the role of private organizations in
drafting legislation, commenting on proposed regulations, and
enforcing the law. This article concludes with recommendations for
dealing with the threats posed by federalization and privatization.
I. FEDERAL LAW
A. Federal Laws and Regulations: The Lack of Uniformity and
Spotty Coverage
Federal consumer protection law is not uniform and its coverage is
not comprehensive. These characteristics have a substantial effect on
litigation and the enforcement of these laws.
Over the course of several years, Congress seemed to be headed in
the direction of establishing a national uniform law to protect
consumers. The Consumer Credit Protection Act regulates the
disclosure of credit terms9 and discrimination in the granting of
credit.' 0 Despite the title of the Act, it also covers many areas besides
credit transactions, for it governs consumer leases," consumer
reporting agencies gathering information for non-credit transactions
such as employment and insurance, 12 debt collection, 13 and electronic
fund transfers. 14 Other federal statutes contribute to providing
national protection for consumers. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty
9. Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000). The Truth-in-Lending Act is primarily a
disclosure statute, requiring creditors to disclose how much they are charging consumers, but not
imposing limits on those fees and rates. Some members of Congress, however, have expressed
impatience with this approach in light of what they regard as abusive practices by the issuers of credit
cards, and have threatened to introduce legislation that industry characterizes as price controls. Stacy
Kaper, Levin Takes Broad Aim at Card Tactics, AM. BANKER, May 16, 2007, at 1, available at 2007
WLNR 9608538.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(c) (2000).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667(f) (2000).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(dXl)(A), (B) (2000).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692(o) (2000).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693(r)(2000).
[Vol. 24:663
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Act governs aspects of consumer sales transactions. 15 The Expedited
Funds Availability Act ensures that depositors have prompt access to
their funds, 16 and the Check 21 Act provides a re-credit and error
resolution procedure for some consumers with checking accounts. 17
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has promulgated extensive
regulations under many of these statutes. 18 In addition, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has authority to enforce the sweeping
terms of the FTC Act, prohibiting "unfair and deceptive acts or
practices." 19 The FTC has promulgated a wide array of regulations
under that authority.
20
Another federal statute that has a public law function is a section in
the U.S. Code that was enacted in 2006.21 A Department of Defense
study found that predatory lending practices targeting military
personnel and their families had national security implications
because those practices adversely affected the morale of the troops.
22
In response, Congress passed a law aimed especially at transactions
such as payday lending and other high interest credit, but the law is
not limited to any particular type of high interest loan. The law
imposes a ceiling on interest rates, prohibits mandatory arbitration,
rollovers and refinancing by the same lender, check holding,
allotments of military paychecks, auto title lending, access to a
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
16. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (2000).
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (2000).
18. E.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (2007); Truth In Lending, 12 C.F.R. pt.
226 (2007); Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2007). The FRB continues to try to improve
its regulations. See, e.g., FRB Proposal to Revise the Rules on Disclosure of Credit Card Terms, Truth in
Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 32,948 (proposed June 14, 2007).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
20. E.g., Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (2007); Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 444
(2007); Holder-In-Due-Course, 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (2007).
21. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, §
670, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 987).
22. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF
THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (2006), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report-to-Congress-finalpdf; see also NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CENTER, IN HARM'S WAY-AT HOME CONSUMER SCAMS AND THE DIRECT MARKETING OF AMERICA'S
MILITARY AND VETERANS (2003), http://www.nclc.org/issues/military/content/report military.pdf.
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service member's bank accounts, and prepayment penalties. 2' The
law requires certain loan disclosures, prohibits a state from permitting
waiver of the state's consumer lending protections by service
members and their dependents if those protections are available to
non-military residents of the state, makes a knowing violation a
misdemeanor, and makes contracts prohibited by the law void from
their inception.
24
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the United States has
a comprehensive and adequate uniform national statutory framework
for consumer protection and its enforcement. Some of the most
important elements of consumer transactions are completely
unregulated. For example, the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 deregulated interest rates for an
entire segment of the consumer credit market. 25 Other types of fees
and charges also are unregulated.26 Privacy protection has become
increasingly important with the development of electronic databases
23. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (Supp. 2007). Soon after the law was enacted, several bank trade associations
urged the Department of Defense to limit application of the law to payday loans and exclude other credit
products. Banks, Credit Unions Seek Relieffrom DOD, but Regulatory Watchdog Opposes Requests, 75
U.S.L.W. 2406 (Jan. 16, 2007). The Department of Defense's final rule largely conforms to banks'
wishes, excluding credit cards, overdraft loans, military installment loans, and all forms of open-end
credit. See Limitations on Terms of Consumer Credit Extended to Service Members and Dependents, 72
Fed. Reg. 50,580, 50,591 (Aug. 31, 2007). Consumer groups condemned the regulations as too narrow
in scope and easy to evade. Press Release, Center for Responsible Lending, Pentagon Adopts Narrow
Credit Rules, Invites Evasion by Predatory Lenders (Sept. 6, 2007),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/press/releases/page.jsp?itemlD=34005726. The American Bankers
Association, the Independent Bankers of America, and the American Financial Services Association
announced their approval of the DOD rules. DOD Issues Final Regulation to Protect Military Members
From Unethical Lending, 89 BANKING REP. (BNA) 345 (Sept. 10, 2007). With few exceptions, states
have not extended the protections in the federal law to non-military consumers. Joe Adler, In Focus:
Fears About a Spate of Cap Laws Unrealized, AM. BANKER, July 16, 2007, at 1, available at 2007
WLNR 13400806 (reporting that only six states have passed laws imposing interest rate caps or banning
payday lending, and the few laws enacted exclude banks from coverage).
24. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (Supp. 2007).
25. State Usury Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 164 (1980); see ELIZABETH RENUART &
KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT 92-98 (3d ed. 2005).
26. For example, rather than regulate fees for overdraft protection programs, the FRB merely
imposed disclosure requirements, amending Reg. DD, 12 C.F.R. pt. 230, which implements the Truth in
Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313. See James J. White, NSF Fees, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 199 (2007);
Mark E. Budnitz, Developments in Payment Systems Law, 10 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 116, 119 (2007).
In 2004, the FRB received more complaints concerning payment card fees and penalties than any other
category of complaint. Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash? Global Proliferation of Payment Cards
and Consumer Protection Policy, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 426, 443 (2006).
[Vol. 24:663
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and the epidemic of identity theft. Rather than enacting laws
instituting broad privacy protection, however, federal law has
inserted narrowly focused protections into a few consumer laws.27
A significant aspect of every consumer transaction involves the
consumer paying for goods or services. Payments law is chaotic, with
great variations. Whether or not federal law governs the payment
aspect of a consumer transaction depends on what type of payment
device the consumer uses and what system processes the payment.
For example, one kind of stored value card is subject to federal
regulation, but all others are not, and few states regulate them.
28
Some aspects of check transactions are subject to federal law.2 ' But
many other features are subject to the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), a state law that specifically eschews protecting consumers.3 °
Electronic fund transfers are subject to federal law, but they also are
subject to rules issued by a private organization. 31 Consumers and
27. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Blilely Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999); Privacy, Security Protection Will Remain Key Parts of FTC's Enforcement
Agenda, 91 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 491 (Nov. 10, 2006) (reporting that Professor Fred
Cate characterized privacy law as "incomplete and often 'incoherent."'). The FCC recently issued a
regulation imposing restrictions on the ability of telecommunications carriers to provide information on
its customers to third parties. FCC Releases Rules to Beef Up Customer Phone Data Protections, 75
U.S.L.W. 2603 (Apr. 10, 2007).
28. Examples of stored value cards include gift cards and prepaid telephone cards. MARK BUDNrrZ
& MARGOT SAUNDERS, CONSUMER BANKING AND PAYMENTS LAW 177-79 (3d ed. 2005); Judith
Rinearson, Regulation of Electronic Stored Value Payment Products Issued By Non-Banks Under State
'Money Transmitter' Licensing Laws, 58 BuS. LAW. 317 (2002). The only type of stored value card
subject to federal regulation is the payroll card. Electronic Fund Transfer, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,437 (Aug. 30,
2006). The case law is unsettled on the issue of whether state law on gift cards in which national banks
are involved is preempted. Compare SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that
state law is preempted), with SPGOC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183 (2nd Cir. 2007) (holding that
state law is not preempted).
29. Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (2000); Check 21 Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
5001-5018 (Supp. 2005). Under the Check 21 Act, only consumers who receive a "substitute check" are
entitled to the rights to a recredit and indemnification. Consumers whose checks are truncated do not
have those rights.
30. See U.C.C § 4-401 cmt. 3, 2B U.L.A. 98 (2002). It is not always self-evident whether consumers
or industry will fare better under federal or state law. See Stacy Kaper, Suddenly Banks Seem To Like
Data Bill Impasse, AM. BANKER, Feb. 27, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 4196050 (reporting that
financial services companies that formerly supported federal legislation to impose uniform national
requirements to protect consumers when there was a data security breach looked more favorably upon
inconsistent, non-uniform state legislation once the Democrats won control of Congress).
31. 2007 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE To RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH
NETWORK (2007); BENJAMIN GEVA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS §§ 5.03-5.08 (2006).
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government agencies can take advantage of provisions in federal
payments statutes that are designed to facilitate litigation to enforce
the law. Enforcement is far more problematic where federal law does
not apply.
Whether consumers are protected also depends upon the type of
institution with whom the consumers do business. The federal law
regulating debt collectors applies only to third party collectors. 32
While a national bank is subject to many federal regulations, check
cashing operations and the Internet lender PayPal are subject to state
money transmitter laws that provide far less consumer protection.33 A
national bank is subject to regulations issued by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), while a state chartered bank is
subject to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
regulations.
34
Because of the lack of uniformity and comprehensive coverage,
consumers and their lawyers face a formidable task identifying what
laws apply to the consumers' disputes, what litigation strategy may
be successful, and what regulatory agency, if any, they might turn to
for assistance.
B. Federal Agency Regulation and Enforcement
Congress has delegated to government agencies the task of filling
in many of the details lacking in the statutes.35 The Federal Trade
Commission has the greatest discretion because it promulgates
regulations pursuant to the very broad statutory provision in the FTC
Act prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts or practices. In the 1970s
the FTC sought to ameliorate many consumer problems by issuing
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) (2000).
33. Budnitz, supra note 26, at 121. See generally Christopher B. Woods, Stored Value Cards, 59
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 211,218 (2005).
34. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, THE REGULATION OF BANKING 830 (1992).
35. Professor Miller notes that, unlike members of Congress, those issuing agency regulations are
not elected by the public. He calls regulation by federal agencies "a type of legislation without
representation." Fred H. Miller, Note: A Perspective on the Regulation B "Effects Test," 62 Bus. LAW.
559, 561 (2007).
[Vol. 24:663
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regulations covering a wide variety of practices. 36 The FTC can
enforce those regulations simply by showing a company violated the
specific requirements in the regulation. The FTC does not have the
more difficult burden, which it has if there is no regulation, of
proving a company acted unfairly or deceptively.
Starting with the Reagan administration, however, the FTC called
an abrupt halt to that effort and instead concentrated on attacking
unfair and deceptive practices on a case-by-case basis.37 Whereas a
regulation automatically and instantly requires compliance by an
entire industry, an action by the FTC against one company at a time
results in far less comprehensive protection, for it affects only the
company targeted. Action against one company sends a warning to
other companies that they also may be subject to an FTC enforcement
38action if they engage in the same or similar conduct. In actuality,
however, the FTC may never act against other companies committing
the same offense for a variety of reasons. 39 The FTC has not
completely abandoned regulatory activity. But most recent FTC
regulations have been issued pursuant to specific mandates from
Congress in legislation dealing with narrow issues rather than under
its discretion to draft regulations under its broad authority to regulate
40
unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
There are other limitations on the FTC's enforcement efforts. Most
FTC actions have been resolved by voluntary settlements in which
the company does not admit it has violated the law. In addition, at
36. See supra note 20.
37. Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection Program During the Miller Years: Lessons
for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 371 (1997).
38. MICHAEL GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 87 (4th ed. 2003).
39. Among the reasons why the FTC may not act are the following: It may not be aware of other
companies that are engaging in that conduct. Even if it is aware, it may not have the resources to act.
Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U.
KAN. L. REv. 1, 12 (2006). Other abusive practices may take priority, requiring the FTC to direct its
efforts elsewhere. Finally, a company may structure its act or practice in a way that is somewhat
different from that of the business against which the FTC acted, giving the company the argument that
its conduct should be distinguished from that which the FTC found illegal. The FTC may choose to act
instead against companies where such distinctions cannot be made because they are easier to win.
40. E.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 600 (2007) (issued pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1681-1681(x) (2000)).
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times the FTC has struggled when trying to find the proper analytical
basis for exercising its authority when confronting new types of
illegal practices. 41 Furthermore, the FTC cannot seek civil penalties
unless a company violates an agreement with the FTC or an FTC
order.42
The (FRB) has issued extensive regulations under the authority
granted by legislation.43 At times it has gone beyond what the law
specifically states to provide consumers with broader coverage. For
example, recently it extended protection to consumers using payroll
cards.44 On the other hand, it has refused to subject financial
institutions to regulations for practices consumers contend violate
existing laws. 45  Courts defer to agency judgment because of
agencies' expertise. If the FRB refuses to declare a practice violates
the law, it is very difficult for consumers to be successful in litigation
to enforce a consumer protection law.
The actions of the OCC illustrate several features of the public law
of financial institutions in the United States. The OCC has issued
several regulations governing the national banks it is charged with
41. E.g., FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc. (F.T.C. 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/reverseauction/index.shtm. Compare Statement of Commissioner Mozelle
W. Thompson (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reversemt.htm (finding respondent liable for
engaging in unfair conduct) with Statement of Commissioners Orson Swindle & Thomas B. Leary
(2000), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reversesl.htm (finding respondent liable for engaging in
deceptive conduct). Privacy, Security Protection Will Remain Key Parts of FTC's Enforcement Agenda,
91 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 491 (Nov. 10, 2006) (reporting that the Chair of the FTC
admitted that developing 'sound public policy can be a daunting challenge' because of the dynamic
environment created by technological change).
42. FTC Renews Support for Legislation to Raise Penalties in Data Privacy Cases, 75 U.S.L.W.
2613 (Apr. 17, 2007) (reporting that the FTC supports legislation to grant it authority to asses civil
penalties against companies that engage in telephone pretexting, spyware, and data security breaches).
43. E.g., Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2007); Consumer Credit Disclosures, 12
C.F.R. pt. 226 (2007); Prompt Availability of Bank Deposits, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2007).
44. Electronic Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,437, 51,438 (Aug. 30, 2006).
45. An example is the FRB's refusal to adopt strong regulations regarding overdraft fees. Budnitz,
supra note 26, at 119; see also Steven Sloan, Bernanke Talks Subprime, Private Equity, AM. BANKER,
May 18, 2007, at 3 (reporting that FRB Chairman Bernanke admitted the FRB had the authority to
prohibit abusive lending practices, but favored better disclosure to consumers and guidance to financial
institutions by supervisory agencies instead). In addition, the FRB has stated that it does not need to
draft rules defining its authority to bring enforcement actions for unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
Instead, it favors taking action on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the FRB has never brought an
enforcement action based on unfair or deceptive practices. Cheyenne Hopkins, The Fed's Record on
Abusive Loans, AM. BANKER, Aug. 29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 16799815.
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regulating. 46 For example, there are rules governing the fees that
banks can charge customers, an issue of growing importance to
consumers. 47 On its face, this would seem to be beneficial to
consumers since neither federal law nor the UCC regulates fees.
48
The OCC regulation, however, provides no protection for consumers.
Instead, the OCC issued a regulation that ensures banks a steady
stream of income from customer fees.49 That is arguably consistent
with its regulatory obligation to permit banks to act in ways that will
promote their safety and soundness, 50 but contrary to the interests of
consumers.
C. Preemption
The OCC has weakened consumer protection and enforcement by
challenging the enforcement of state laws to protect consumers on the
ground that its regulations preempt state law.51 By preempting state
46. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and
Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
47. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2007); see Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Debit Reward Payoff: More Bounce Fees,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 1, 2007, at I (describing a study of the overdraft fees banks collected from
consumers using debit cards); Budnitz, supra note 26, at 119 (discussing overdraft fees and bounced
check protection programs).
48. The UCC does not regulate bank fees. U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 3, 2B U.L.A. 116 (2002).
49. The regulation states that the amounts a bank charges for account services is a business decision
to be made "according to sound banking judgment and safe and sound banking principles." 12 C.F.R. §
7.4002 (2007). A bank "may consider" the costs incurred by the bank, plus a profit margin, in providing
the service, and the deterrence of misuse by bank customers. Id The latter means a bank can charge
more than its cost and a reasonable profit margin in order to deter customers from engaging in practices
such as bouncing checks.
50. The former general counsel of Citigroup's Europe and North America card business claims: "The
role the OCC prefers is to help maximize the profits of banks by protecting them from competition,
consumers, and state laws." Duncan MacDonald, Eventually, Industry Will Regret Watters Ruling, AM.
BANKER, May 18, 2007, at 11. Comptroller John Dugan denies that the OCC is concerned only with
safety and soundness to the exclusion of consumer protection. Cheyenne Hopkins, Consumer
Protection, and Image Protection, AM. BANKER, Feb. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 3006983. An
OCC critic, however, claims the OCC is "an agency whose mission is in conflict." Id; see Eugene A.
Ludwig, Enforcement Disconnect Causes Undue Harm, AM. BANKER, Feb. 23, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 3956521 (describing the banks' difficulties when facing enforcement actions by state attorneys
general as well as federal agencies).
51. The Supreme Court recently upheld the OCC's power to preempt state law. Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); see MacDonald, supra note 50, at 11 (the former general counsel of
Citigroup's Europe and North America card business opining that "[t]he industry's justification for
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consumer protection laws, the OCC promotes the interests of national
banks. The OCC's preemption of state law has a substantial effect on
enforcement. According to the New York State Superintendent of
Banks, the OCC's preemption of state law will make national bank
charters "more attractive ... [and] is likely to chill state regulation
and/or encourage the migration of state institutions to states with less
regulation. ' 52 In addition, preemption "will further impede local




States have enacted a wide variety of laws to protect consumers.
Chief among them are laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and
practices, called "UDAP" or "mini-FTC" statutes. Every state has
enacted a version of a UDAP law.54 Typically, in addition to a
general prohibition of unfair and deceptive acts or practices, these
statutes include a "laundry list" of specific acts and practices that are
deemed to be unfair or deceptive.55 Most importantly, the state's
attorney general is authorized to enforce UDAP laws, and consumers
have a private right of action.56 The latter is of major significance
Watters-that a myriad of federal laws will adequately protect consumer interests-is a joke. Much of
federal law provides only nominal protection of consumers and some of it is actually harmful to their
interests.") While aggressively attacking states for trying to enforce consumer protection laws against
national banks, the OCC is also trying to gain the cooperation of other federal agencies to pool resources
to assist consumers. Cheyenne Hopkins, OCC Seeks Help With Its One-Stop Consumer Site, AM.
BANKER, July 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 13556787.
52. Hilary Johnson, N.Y. Official Gives Views on Subprime, Preemption, AM. BANKER, May 14,
2007, at 2.
53. Id. See Cheyenne Hopkins, Taylor, Going Repeats Dual System Fears, AM. BANKER, March 9,
2007, at 1 (quoting the former N.Y. State Superintendent of Banks opining that preemption results in
large banks applying for federal rather than state charters in order to avoid state consumer protection
laws and reporting on the substantial reduction of revenue to the state banking agency that resulted,
providing an incentive for that agency to be less aggressive in enforcing those laws).
54. JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES I
(5th ed. 2001).
55. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393(b) (Supp. 2007); SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 54, at 93.
56. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 54, at 469-535, 775-807.
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because consumers have no private right of action under the FTC
Act.
5 7
As significant as UDAP laws are to consumer protection in the
United States, the European Union Directive on Unfair Contract
Terms provides even greater protection than the UDAP statutes.58
The Directive's definition of unfair terms is so broad that it could
strike down as unfair many terms found in standard American
consumer contracts. 59 For example, in cases brought pursuant to laws
enacted by individual countries to implement the Directive, the
following terms have been found unfair: disclaiming warranty
liability, permitting the company to change sales terms at any time,
disclaiming liability for late delivery, and a choice of forum clause
requiring litigation to be filed in the forum where the merchant's
place of business is located. 60 The Directive requires contracts to be
written in "plain language," and the United Kingdom understands
that to mean consumers must be able to understand the contract's
terms without having to consult a lawyer.61 The European Union has
issued regulations on unfair terms. Those regulations include a non-
exclusive list of unfair terms including the following that might be
subject to successful challenge if the United States had comparable
laws: denying consumer full redress when the business breaches the
57. Courts also have refused to find a private right of action in other statutes. See, e.g., Deceptive
Practices: TCPA 's Identification Requirements Are Not Enforceable in Private Action, [Highlights]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at D10, May 2, 2007 (rejecting contention that section 227(d) of
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act provides a private right of action).
58. Winn & Webber, supra note 4, at 217.
59. Under the Directive, "contract terms not individually negotiated are unfair if they create a
significant imbalance, to the consumer's detriment, between the rights and obligations of the contracting
parties." Id.
60. Id. at 221-22. The Brazilian Consumer Protection Code of 1990 also regulates unfair terms
including voiding clauses that reduce the business' liability for defective goods, fail to provide
consumers with a refund option, require mandatory arbitration, and permit the business to unilaterally
change its obligations to perform under the contract. Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide
Standard for Protections of Consumers in the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised
UCC Article 2?, 41 TEx. INT'L L.J. 223, 257-58 (2006). Mexico's consumer protection law invalidates
certain terms in adhesion contracts, such as those allowing the seller to unilaterally modify its
obligations. Id. at 257. Japan's Consumer Contract Act voids as unfair terms clauses that exclude or
restrict the seller's liability for damages when the seller does not perform. Id. at 249.
61. Winn & Webber, supra note 4, at 218.
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contract, permitting the business to vary the terms of the contract
after it was formed, and subjecting consumers to unfair penalties. 62
In addition to UDAP statutes, states have enacted laws
regulating many specific types of transactions including retail
installment sales contracts63 and motor vehicle sales financing.
64
States also regulate home solicitation sales65 and usury.66 While these
statutes provide consumers another layer of protection besides the
UDAP laws, they have a very narrow scope.
State attorneys general have established a national organization,
the National Association of Attorneys General, that has a unit
devoted to sharing information about illegal behavior towards
consumers and coordinating enforcement actions.67 A few attorneys
general have been particularly active enforcing laws that protect
consumers. For example, former New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer brought a number of major consumer cases.68  Former
62. Id. The French trial court found that the terms in AOL's contract were unfair. See id at 222-23.
63. E.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-1 to -16 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
64. E.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-30 to -42 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
65. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 10-1-6 (2000).
66. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT 26-31 (3d ed. 2005).
67. Dennis Cuevas, Nat'l Ass'n of Attorney Generals, Consumer Protection,
http://www.naag.org/consumerprotection.php (last visited June 30, 2007).
68. ING Settles with N.Y., N.H. for $32.75 Million, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Oct. 23, 2006, at 3,
available at 2006 WLNR 18377197 (describing Spitzer's action against ING for paying millions each
year to teachers unions which in turn steered business to ING); Paul Grimaldi, CVS to Pay $152,000
Fine to New York State, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Oct. 17, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 18092324
(describing Spitzer's action against CVS for failing to make sweepstakes entry forms available to those
who did not purchase goods from CVS, in violation of N.Y. law); Settlement Reached Between State
and Mobile Home Retailer, BUS. REV., Sept. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16262748 (describing
Spitzer's action against a mobile home retailer that failed to complete timely installations and other
repair work); Fred 0. Williams, Spitzer, Faso Address Abusive Collectors, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 12,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14005733 (describing Spitzer's actions against debt collectors who
hound consumers to pay obligations consumers have already satisfied). Spitzer's successor, Andrew
Cuomo, appears to intend an aggressive consumer protection administration. See First Premier Bank to
Pay Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at C2 (reporting that Cuomo reached a settlement whereby a
bank paid $4.5 million for refunds to consumers for allegedly deceptive credit card marketing practices);
Michelle Kessler, Cuomo Sues Dell on Behalf of Customers, USA TODAY, May 17, 2007, at 3B
(reporting that Cuomo sued Dell for inducing consumers to sign up for what they believed was no-
interest financing, then charging interest, and not honoring service contracts); see also Kate Berry, Wide
Scope in Ohio AG's Subprime Legal Plans, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2007 (reporting that the Ohio
Attorney General announced his intention to sue mortgage lenders, bond rating agencies, and Wall
Street investment banks that invested in bonds backed by subprime mortgages).
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Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch did the same.69
UDAP laws are not a panacea, however. State attorneys general
have limited resources and many other duties besides enforcing the
UDAP law. Even when an attorney general office devotes substantial
resources, its efforts may be aggressively opposed by federal
enforcement agencies, resulting in a halt to state actions. For
example, the OCC has successfully challenged major cases brought
by New York's former Attorney General.70  The OCC's actions
against the New York Attorney General likely dissuaded other
attorneys general from bringing actions against national banks
violating the laws of their states. In 2007, the United State Supreme
Court upheld the OCC's preemption of certain types of state laws that
otherwise would have applied to the real estate operating subsidiary
of a national bank.71 The sharply differing views of the majority and
dissent in that case illustrate the continuing battle between the states
and the federal government over who has authority to regulate
financial institutions operating within a state. The battle continues
because the United States still has not determined the proper balance
of power between the states and the federal government.
69. Thomas Lee, Ameriquest Lawsuits Can Be Bundled, Judge Rules: Granting the Plaintiffs Class-
Action Status Means the Subprime Lender Could Face 22,000 Minnesota Borrowers, STAR TRIB., April
20, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 7501596 (describing Hatch's investigation of subprime lender that
uncovered illegal practices and led to major settlement); H.J. Cummins, Searches Find Dissatisfaction;
Top Executives Are Handing Over as Much as $15,000 for Help in Landing a Dream Job. But Some
Complain that Job "Agents" Don't Deliver, STAR TRiB., July 10, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
12036538 (describing Hatch's action against a company that falsely claimed it had "special access to the
hidden job market" and promising it could find consumers jobs in 120 days); Glenn Howatt, Hatch
Criticizes Blue Cross' Fund Reserves. He Says Premiums Continue to Rise While Reserves Total More
Than $1 Billion, STAR TRmB., Apr. 27, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 7098505 (describing Hatch's
investigation of Blue Cross and Blue Shield).
70. Office of Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also
Mortgage Market Turmoil: Hearing on H.R. 1182 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 1-10 (2007) (statement of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., North Carolina Commissioner of
Banks) (testifying that the OCC has supported national bank's challenges to Spitzer's attempts to
enforce federal laws, while refusing to enforce those laws itself); Duncan A. MacDonald, Viewpoint:
Electoral Tide, a Warning on Preemption, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
22374624 (predicting that Congress will pass legislation supporting Spitzer's position that the OCC does
not have the authority to preempt state enforcement of laws against national banks).
71. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
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III. ENFORCEMENT BY CONSUMERS
Several federal statutes include specific provisions to encourage
enforcement by enabling the consumer to act as a "private attorney
general." These laws permit class actions and allow a successful
consumer to collect not only actual damages, but also statutory
damages, costs, and attorney's fees.72
A. The ECOA Still Has Potential
Perhaps the consumer statute with the most obvious characteristics
of public law is the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). 73 That
law prohibits discrimination in granting, increasing, or terminating
credit 74 based on "race, color, national origin, sex or marital status, or
age," income derived from public assistance, or the good faith
exercise of any right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.75
Private enforcement is encouraged: consumers who prove a business
failed to comply with the ECOA are entitled to actual damages, costs,
and attorney's fees.76 Consumers' ability to prove discrimination
under the ECOA has been mixed.77 The recent string of favorable
settlements in cases against automakers accused of charging higher
loan rates to blacks and Hispanics, however, demonstrates that the
ECOA is still a powerful tool under the right circumstances.78
72. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1693(m) (2000).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f(2000).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c) (2007).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e)(a), (d) (2000).
77. Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that consumers can try to
prove discrimination using the "effects test," but noting that it is difficult for consumers to satisfy its
requirements and finding consumer in the instant case failed to do so). See generally DEANNE LOONIN &
CHI CHI WU, CREDIT DISCRIMINATION (4th ed. 2005).
78. The cases are described at http://www.nclc.org. For a critical assessment, see John L. Ropiequet
& Nathan 0. Lundby, Dealer Rate Participation Class Actions Under the ECOA: Have We Reached the
End of the Road?, 62 Bus. LAW. 663 (2007). See also Will Lester, Report: Race Bias Found in Auto
Loans, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 8, 2007, at C3 (reporting on a Consumer Federation of America study
that concluded, based on FRB data, that blacks were more likely than whites and Hispanics to be
charged higher auto loan rates).
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B. State UDAP Laws and Their Limitations
State UDAP statutes provide a fertile ground for consumers
seeking redress for abusive behavior. Much conduct can be subsumed
under the rubric of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Courts in
many jurisdictions, however, have greatly restricted the utility of
these laws. Some have reasoned that the statutes truly are "public
law." Therefore, consumers cannot pursue cases unless they can
prove that the defendant's conduct not only injured the consumer
plaintiff, but also that bringing the action is in the public interest.
79
One could argue that it is reasonable to so limit a cause of action
based on a violation that is as broad and vague as "unfair or
deceptive." Requiring consumers to demonstrate an action is in the
public interest, however, is problematic. For instance, such a
requirement forces the court to read into the statute a requirement that
the legislature did not include. 8 Moreover, it is a requirement that is
contrary to the statute's- objective of providing broad relief for
consumers.81 "Unfair and deceptive" are broad terms, but were used
because of the ability of fraudsters to constantly alter their conduct to
escape coming within the scope of laws drafted to combat specific
conduct. Imposing a public interest requirement by judicial fiat also
conflicts with the mandate in UDAP laws that require courts to
construe the statute liberally to promote its objective to protect
consumers. 82 Finally, the public interest requirement has been
difficult to apply to specific cases.83 Courts have struggled to
describe which acts are purely private, and which affect not only the
consumer plaintiff, but also the consuming public generally.
79. GREENFIELD, supra note 38, at 151.
80. Id.
81. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391(a) (2000) (stating that the purpose of the Georgia UDAP law is "to protect
consumers and legitimate business enterprises . .
82. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391(b) (2000).
83. Compare Paces Ferry Dodge v. Thomas, 331 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding consumer
satisfied public interest requirement because cars were sold on seller's lot), with Burdakin v. Hub Motor
Co., 357 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that public interest requirement not satisfied where
truck was repaired by a vehicle repair shop).
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According to some courts, only if the latter is affected is the business
subject to the UDAP statute and its enforcement. 84
UDAP statutes contain many limitations.85 Some state UDAP laws
prohibit class actions.86 This prevents UDAP statutes from having a
public law function, as consumer plaintiffs cannot use the law to
protect anyone except themselves. UDAP statutes do not invalidate
industry conduct that is permitted by other law. For example, conduct
permitted by the UCC is immune from a UDAP challenge. This
undermines consumer protection because the UCC is not intended to
protect consumers.87 Moreover, the UCC's rules are primarily default
88rules; they do not apply if the parties agree to something else.
Consequently, a business can avoid the default rules by drafting
contracts imposing terms more favorable to the business than those
provided for in the UCC. As a result, there is far less of a "public"
law characteristic to the UCC than to typical consumer protection
laws that impose mandatory obligations on companies dealing with
consumers.
C. The Limits of the Unconscionability Doctrine
Consumers have challenged the contracts they entered into based
on the doctrine of unconscionability. A threshold issue is whether it is
appropriate to categorize the law of unconscionability as public law.
Ordinarily unconscionability arises as a defense in breach of contract
cases. A breach of contract case typically is a private dispute between
84. See, e.g., Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). In trying to articulate which
situations fall under the scope of the Georgia UDAP law, the court used terms that are difficult to apply
such as an act or practice that "had or has the potential harmful effect on the general consuming public."
Id. at 914. The statute does not cover "private wrongs occurring outside the context of the public
consumer marketplace." Id
85. SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 54, at 18-88 (describing the exemptions of certain transactions
and types of sellers, the exclusion of certain persons such as assignees, and conflict with federal law).
86. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a) (2000); see SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 54, at 648.
87. E.g., U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 3, 2B U.L.A. 98 (2002); see also id. § 4-406 cmL 3, at 116.
88. Id. § 4-103(a), 2B U.L.A. 14 (2002).
[VoL 24:663
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 680 2007-2008
680  I E SIT  I  (   
   
4 
85  
8   V   
    
 V  
 , t 
V   
 V  
.87 V '  lt 
   
,  
  
V   
 V   
 i s   
 
.  scionability t i e 
  
   
i ilit   
ilit   t 
  
, . t   
  P   
    t            l  li .  
l .  
r r t l ." ld. 
.   ,   ,       
 t   ll , t  l i   t i     i ,  li t it  l l ). 
. . ., . . . .   ;    ,  t  ,  . 
. . ., V. . .  -  t. ,  V. . .  ( );  /  i .  -  t. , t . 
l . V . 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss3/1
20081 FEDERALIZATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 681
two parties with no effect on other members of the public.
8 9
Procedural unconscionability examines the process of making the
contract and considers factors such as "the conspicuousness and
comprehensibility of the contract language ...and the presence or
absence of a meaningful choice." 90 This is, in part, an inquiry into
whether there was, in reality, an agreement by the parties to the term
the consumer is challenging. Moreover, the consumer's remedy is to
have the court strike those contract terms that are unconscionable.
91
All of these factors illustrate the private law character of the doctrine
of unconscionability.
In other respects, however, unconscionability bears characteristics
of public law. It has been defined as "abhorrent" to the public values
of "good morals and conscience. ' 92 Most courts go beyond
procedural unconscionability and also require the consumer to prove
substantive unconscionability. In deciding if the consumer has
satisfied this requirement, the court considers "the commercial
reasonableness of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of the
terms, the allocation of risks between the parties, and similar public
policy concerns.
93
Courts have recognized the public law aspect of unconscionability,
and it has contributed to their caution in permitting consumers to
prevail on this theory. Some courts acknowledge that
unconscionability promotes important public policy objectives
because it is "a potent tool for shielding disadvantaged and
uneducated consumers from overreaching merchants."94 But instead
of boldly using unconscionability as a public law doctrine to protect
consumers, courts are restrained by contrary public policy. They
believe they have an obligation to apply state law that "protects the
89. But see In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263 (1986), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1354 (1lth Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989) (finding a breach of contract by a company constituted an
unfair practice under the FTC Act).
90. NEC Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1996).
91. U.C.C. § 2-302(1), 1 U.L.A. 409 (2004).
92. F.N. Roberts Pest Control Co. v. McDonald, 208 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
93. NEC Technologies, 478 S.E.2d at 772.
94. Id. at 774.
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freedom of parties to contract. ' 95 In addition, courts refuse to be
overly paternalistic and to release consumers from "bad bargains." 96
Consequently, courts often decline to find that contract terms are
unconscionable unless they believe a "decent, fair-minded person
would view the ensuing result [of enforcing the challenged term with]
... a profound sense of injustice., 97 The end result is that, because of
countervailing policy considerations, the doctrine of
unconscionability has limited utility for consumers. The courts'
reluctance to use the doctrine of unconscionability as a tool to
promote consumer protection reflects the United States' general
failure to reach a consensus on the need for effective enforcement of
strong consumer protection laws. The European Union's Directive on
unfair contract terms provides greater protection.
98
D. Arbitration, Privatization, and Class Actions
Consumers have won many victories in their battle against abusive
practices. Many laws are on the books, and consumer lawyers have
brought thousands of successful lawsuits to enforce those laws and
protect the public. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles to strong
enforcement remain. The class action is the most effective way for
consumer advocates to enforce laws to protect consumers. 99
Businesses, however, have inserted mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses into most consumer contracts. 100 These clauses prohibit
consumers from bringing their actions in court. This results in the
privatization of the judicial system.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 774-75 (quoting Fotomat Corp. of Florida v. Chanda, 464 So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)).
97. Id. at 774.
98. Winn & Webber, supra note 4, at 217; see supra notes 58-62.
99. E.g., Wells Fargo Settles Class Suit over California Mortgage Practices, 88 BANKING REP.
(BNA) 761 (Apr. 30, 2007) (reporting that Wells Fargo agreed to settle a consumer class action claiming
that the bank did not provide correct information about fees and penalties).
100. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for
Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1240 (2001).
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Businesses defend the use of arbitration clauses.'( 1 They contend
that arbitration often is faster and less expensive than litigation in
court. One reason it often is faster is that discovery is far more
limited. Faster resolution means a successful consumer can obtain the
arbitrator's award more promptly. Quicker litigation can result in
lower attorney fees for the parties.
The disadvantages for consumers and public law enforcement far
outweigh these alleged benefits, however. Arbitration is a secret
proceeding; litigation in that forum is not a matter of public record.
Consequently, government enforcement agencies have no easy way
to learn what cases are being arbitrated. In addition, the agreements
bar consumers from bringing their arbitration cases as class
actions. 1°2 Businesses point out this makes resolution of consumer
cases much faster and less expensive than if class actions were
allowed. Unfortunately, it also often makes it infeasible for
consumers to enforce consumer laws. 10 3 The courts are divided as to
the validity of barring class actions in arbitration. 104 Even if a
consumer were permitted to bring a class action before an arbitration
panel, there is no assurance that public laws to protect consumers
would be enforced, because arbitrators' awards cannot be challenged
in court on the basis that the arbitrators failed to follow the law. 10 5
101. Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-With Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 252-57 (2006).
102. Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75
(2004).
103. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007).
104. Compare Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del. 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2032 (2007) (class action waiver unconscionable under New Jersey law where
consumer had a small claim involving complex issues), with Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d
104 (N.J. 2006) (class action waiver not per se unconscionable in case where consumer sought large
award). See also Dale, 498 F.3d 1216 (finding class action waiver unconscionable where the cost of
vindicating consumers' claims is greater than each consumer's potential recovery; Cable Act does not
provide for recovery of attorney's fees; and bad faith must be shown to recover attorney's fees under
Georgia law).
105. Some courts permit the losing party to appeal based on the arbitrator's "manifest disregard of the
law." But courts define that doctrine very narrowly. See, e.g., Am. Laser Vision, P.A. v. The Laser
Vision Inst., L.L.C., 487 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2007).
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The role of arbitration in other countries is very different. In
Mexico and countries in South America, arbitration is rare, and when
it takes place, usually is voluntary and conducted by a government
body, not a private organization. 106 Mandatory consumer arbitration
generally is banned by the European Union'0 7 and mandatory
arbitration clauses are deemed void in Brazil. 108
E. Other Class Action Restrictions
Not all litigation is subject to arbitration agreements. But a
transaction not subject to an arbitration clause may nevertheless be
denied class action status for not satisfying the requirements for class
certification, either under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
applicable consumer statute. 10 9 Even a successful class action in a
court may do little to protect consumers. Consumer protection
statutes typically place a cap on the amount of damages the consumer
class can recover. 110 This prevents a class action from forcing a
company into bankruptcy. As a result, where the defendant has
limited assets, class recovery will be small."'
Many major consumer cases are brought by legal services offices
representing low-income consumers. Their ability to do so
effectively, however, is severely hampered by an amendment to the
106. Jean Stemlight, Is the Consumer Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 852
(2002); Robert G. Vaughn, Consumer Protection Laws in South America, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 275, 316-17 (1994).
107. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 99, 156 (2006).
108. Martin, supra note 60, at 257-58.
109. See, e.g., McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding
that Congress intended the right of rescission under TILA to be a personal remedy only); see Harry
Terris, Should Class Action Suits Trigger Bulk Rescissions?, AM. BANKER, Mar. 8, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 4828396.
110. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2XB) (2000).
1l1. Stolicker v. Muller, Muller, Richmond, Harms, Myers & Sgroi, P.C., No. 1:04-CV-733, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26338 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2007) (granting preliminary approval of the settlement of
a class action for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, where because of the defendant's
low net worth, if all 505 members of the class file claims, each will receive only $1.75).
[Vol. 24:663
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Legal Services Corporation Act that forbids Congress from funding
any such office that initiates or participates in class action lawsuits."
12
In addition, in 2005 the federal Class Action Fairness Act went
into effect. That law makes it easier to remove multi-state class action
cases to federal court.1 13 The statute was pushed by businesses who
accused consumers of bringing cases in state courts where they could
shop for consumer-friendly judges. According to a recent study, the
Act is working as its proponents had hoped, resulting in more cases
being removed to the federal courts." 14
IV. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS
A law may permit certain business practices, thus precluding
litigation challenging them. A law may impose requirements on
business, but restrict enforcement so greatly that there is no way to
ensure compliance. Consequently, it is relevant to consider the
crucial role private organizations play in drafting public laws
affecting consumers. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute
(ALI) drafted the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs sales,
personal property leases, negotiable instruments, and secured
transactions.1 15 They also drafted amendments to keep these laws up
to date. 116 Most states have enacted the UCC as proposed by these
private organizations. 17 As a result, this privately drafted law has
become public law. Critics complain that many major issues have
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(e)(d)(5) (2000); see 45 C.F.R. §1617.3 (2007).
113. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (Supp. 2007). Some district courts place the burden of showing the $5
million dollar controversy threshold was not met on the party opposing removal, but the Third Circuit
recently decided the party seeking removal has that burden. Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469 (3d Cir.
2006).
114. Ralph Lindeman, Federal Courts Take More Class Actions Since Passage of Business-Backed
Law, 88 BANKING REP. (BNA) 761 (Apr. 30, 2007) (reporting on study conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center, showing an increase in cases raising state law contract and fraud claims).
115. MARIoN W. BENFIELD, JR. & MICHAEL M GREENFIELD, SALES, 2-4 (5th ed. 2007). Professor
Budnitz is a member of the ALl.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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been resolved to the detriment of consumer interests." 8 Although
immensely influential, NCCUSL is not always successful. In the
1970's NCCUSL promoted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
(UCCC), which was adopted by only eight states. 1 9 The UCCC was
opposed by those who claimed that, like the UCC, it did not provide
adequate protection for consumers. 120  More recently, NCCUSL
proposed a law governing software that garnered so much opposition
from consumer groups and others that the organization stopped
promoting it after it had been adopted by only two states.
12 1
Another private organization drafts rules that govern an electronic
payment processing system called the Automated Clearinghouse
(ACH). Crucial payments to and from consumer bank accounts are
governed by these rules, including debit cards, direct deposit,
preauthorized transfers of mortgage and other recurring obligations,
and electronic conversion of checks. Unlike the UCC that was drafted
by NCCUSL and the ALI, the National Automated Clearinghouse
Association (NACHA) rules do not have to be enacted into law by a
legislature. In order to participate in the ACH system, businesses
must sign contracts in which they agree to comply with the NACHA
rules. The parties to these contracts are NACHA, financial
institutions, and merchants. NACHA drafts the rules. Neither
consumers nor any government agency has a formal role in drafting
the rules because they are not members of NACHA.1
22
118. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U CC. Articles Three and Four: A Process Which
Excluded Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REv. 827 (1992); Gail K.
Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42
ALA. L. REv. 679 (1991); Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revisions of Articles 3
and 4,42 ALA. L. REv. 551 (1991).
119. Chris Peterson, Failed Markets, Failing Government, or Both? Learning from the Unintended
Consequences of Utah Consumer Credit Law on Vulnerable Debtors, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 543, 552
(2001).
120. Id.
121. Daniel A. DeMarco & Christopher B. Wick, Now UCITA, Now You Don't: A Bankruptcy
Practitioner's Observations on the Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, AM.
BAHKR. INST. J. 34 (May 2004).
122. Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the
Risk of Political Defeat, 24 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 247, 264 (2005). Another example of private
lawmaking is the rules of the credit card associations. Arnold S. Rosenberg, Better Than Cash? Global
[Vol. 24:663
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The issue for consumer protection enforcement is whether there is
any practical significance to the fact that the NACHA rules are
private law rather than public law. These rules would be an
appropriate subject for public law since they govern a vast national
system transferring billions of dollars every day, rules that directly
affect many millions of consumers and their money. On the other
hand, the rules do not, and legally cannot dilute any of the
considerable protections guaranteed consumers in the Electronic
Fund Transfers Act. Furthermore, in some respects the NACHA rules
provide even more consumer protection than applicable law. 123
Nevertheless, there are serious consequences to the NACHA rules
being private law. It is not at all clear whether consumers have any
remedies when a financial institution, merchant, payment processor,
or creditor violates NACHA rules. Courts are divided as to whether
consumers can sue when a firm violates the rules because consumers
are not a party to the agreements that are subject to the rules. 124
In addition, the government may refrain from enacting needed
protections into law, believing they are not needed because they are
in the NACHA rules. However, consumers could lose those
protections overnight if NACHA decides to change their rules. If that
happened, the government might come to the rescue and eventually
pass laws to fill the gap. But it is also possible Congress would fail to
act. And even if it did enact legislation, Congress typically does not
consider and pass new laws quickly. Should a considerable amount of
time elapse before Congress acted, consumers would be at risk during
this time.
Private organizations are actively involved in attempting to
influence legislation. National trade groups such as the American
Proliferation of Payment Cards and Consumer Protection Policy, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 426,
445 (2006).
123. BUDNTZ & SAUNDERS, supra note 28, at 87.
124. Volden v. Innovative Fin. Sys., Inc., 440 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that consumer cannot
bring breach of contract claim for failure of check casher to comply with NACHA rules). But see
Security First Network Bank v. C.A.P.S., Inc., No. 01 C 342, 2002 WL 485352 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2002)
(permitting non-party to sue for violation of NACHA rules).
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Bankers Association, America's Community Banks, 125  the
Community Financial Services Association, 126 and the Mortgage
Bankers Association, as well as individual companies such as
CitiBank, often submit testimony to Congress and regulatory
agencies, urging them to enact statutes and regulations favorable to
them. 27 Organizations such as Consumer Federation of America,
Public Justice (formerly Trial Lawyers for Public Justice),
Consumers Union, the National Consumer Law Center, and U.S.
PIRG do the same for consumer interests.128 The major tactical
125. The American Bankers Association and America's Community Bankers agreed to merge their
groups. Sarah Colwell, Colorado Springs Financial Briefs, COLO. SPRINGS Bus. J., June 29, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 12480997.
126. The Community Financial Services Association, an organization representing payday lenders,
has been particularly active in response to widespread challenges to its industry. In 2007 it began a $10
million consumer education project and established a code of best practices for its members. William
Launder, Payday Loans Get Seal of Approval from Trade Group, Am. BANKER, Feb. 22, 2007, at 7,
available at 2007 WLNR 3870122. A consumer advocate criticized the Association's efforts: "It's really
just a halfhearted attempt at self-regulation and a full-scale push for self promotion of a junk product...
• [The CFSA is] trying to preempt state legislation efforts by framing themselves as an effort at self-
regulation." Id.
127. Improving Credit Card Consumer Protection, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 1 I 0th Cong. (2007) (Statement of
John Carey, Chief Administrative Officer, CitiCards), available at 2007 WL 1651810; Credit Card
Regulation Issues, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Financial Services, Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Edward L. Yingling, President, Am. Bankers
Assoc.), available at 2007 WL 1228858; Protecting Homebuyers From Mortgage Abuse, Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Housing, Transportation &
Community Development, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of John Robbins, Chair, Mortgage Bankers
Assoc.), available at 2007 WL 1834523; Industrial Banks, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Arthur R. Connelly, First Vice Chairman, America's
Community Banks), available at 2007 WL 1213346; Predatory Lending To Military, Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2006) (Statement of Hilary B. Miller,
President, Payday Loan Bar Assoc., on behalf of the Community Financial Services Assoc.), available
at 2006 WL 2629206.
128. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Commercial & Administrative Law, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement ofF. Paul Bland, Jr., Public Justice),
available at 1686340; Consumer Credit Reports, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Financial Services,
110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Chi Chi Wu, Staff Att'y, National Consumer Law Center), available
at 2007 WL 1750167; Child Product Safety Bills, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, United States Public Interest Research Group), available at
2007 WL 1624049; Foreclosures and Risky Lending, Hearing Before H. Comm. on H. Oversight &
Government Reform, Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Jean Ann Fox,
Director, Consumer Protection, Consumer Federation of America), Housing Loans, Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Housing & Transportation (2006)
(Statement of Kevin Jewell, Consultant, Consumers Union), available at 2006 WL 886495.
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difference between the industry groups and the consumer groups is
the ability of the individual company members of the trade
organizations to make huge political contributions to members of
Congress.
129
In addition to legislative advocacy, consumer organizations play an
active role enforcing the law through litigation. The National
Consumer Law Center, the AARP Foundation, Public Justice, the
National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Consumers Union
have acted to ensure that public consumer laws are enforced. 130 For
example, the National Consumer Law Center, together with private
attorneys, brought a series of cases against auto-makers for violating
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 13 1
In bringing actions to enforce consumer protection laws, consumer
organizations and private lawyers are fulfilling the "private attorney
general" role that is encouraged by those public law statutes that
provide for statutory damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 132 Public
consumer laws are intended to protect the general consumer
population, but Congress recognized that government enforcement
agencies lack the resources to ensure satisfaction of that goal. The
private attorney general provisions can go far toward achieving that
goal if other obstacles do not stand in the way. As discussed above,
there are major impediments that make this goal difficult to attain.
Other countries go much further than the United States, granting
129. How a Bad Bill Becomes a Law, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2005, at C4 (stating that credit card
issuers and finance companies spent $40 million in political contributions and many additional millions
in a successful fifteen year lobbying effort that resulted in changes to bankruptcy law favorable to them,
but detrimental to consumers). Jim Tankersley, Bush Fund-Raisers Cash in by Giving-Then Receiving,
THE BLADE, Dec. 18, 2005, available at
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/20051218/NEWS09/512180341 (reporting that
MBNA, a credit card issuer, spent almost $20 million from 1998 to 2004 to lobby for a favorable
bankruptcy law).
130. E.g., In re: Washington Mutual Overdraft Protection Litigation, 201 F. App'x 409 (9th Cir. 2006)
(National Consumer Law Center); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006)
(Public Justice); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 426 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 2005) (National Assoc. of
Consumer Advocates); Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2001) (AARP Foundation).
131. The cases are summarized at http://www.nclc.org (last visited June 28, 2007).
132. Robert Murken, Can't Get No Satisfaction? Revising How Courts Rescind Home Equity Loans
Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 457, 461 (2004) (describing how Congress included
the private attomey general concept in the Truth in Lending Act).
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consumer organizations an official role in ensuring that consumers
are protected.1
33
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO HELP SAVE CONSUMER LAW
As discussed above, consumer law increasingly has become
federal law. Having national public laws governing consumer
transactions is sound because many consumer problems are national
in scope and transactions increasingly cross state lines. States,
however, have always played a critical role in protecting consumers.
State laws can fill gaps left in the federal law, serve as laboratories
that experiment with new approaches to deal with consumer
problems, and respond to problems that have a particularly harsh
impact on consumers in their state. 134 For example, a state with many
Hispanic speaking residents may want to require bi-lingual
disclosures of vital information. State agencies enforcing those laws
often are an important component in protecting consumers. Federal
agencies, however, have undermined this effort by aggressively
pursuing a policy of preemption. 135 That does not necessarily result in
substituting federal consumer protection rules and enforcement in
place of state laws and enforcement. Rather, it often creates a
vacuum, with the federal agency permitting the conduct that state law
prohibited. 136
133. For example, Brazil's Consumer Code authorizes consumer organizations to bring lawsuits on
behalf of consumers and request that the attorney general take action against companies using unfair
contract terms. Vaughn, supra note 106, at 317. European Union rules authorize "group litigation" or
"representative proceedings" that permit consumer advocacy groups to file cases. Winn & Webber,
supra note 4, at 220, 222. In France, the Union Federale des Consummateurs is a particularly active
consumer group recognized by that country's statutes. David Naylor & Cyril Ritter, French Judgment
Condemning AOL Illustrates EU Consumer Protection Issues Facing U.S. Businesses Operating in
Europe, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 881, 881-82 (2005).
134. "Consumer protection matters are typically left to the control of the states precisely so that
different states can apply different regulatory standards based on what is locally appropriate." SPGGC v.
Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 2007). There are major obstacles, however, to state law
providing consumers with robust protection. E.g., O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a) (2000) (prohibiting class
actions); Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (adding public interest requirement).
135. See supra note 70.
136. Testimony of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., supra note 70; Duncan A. Macdonald, supra note 70. In
addition, the Class Action Fairness Act restricts the ability of consumers to enforce consumer protection
[Vol. 24:663
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The second major challenge to consumer protection is the
privatization of consumer law, primarily through the pervasive use of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Arbitration privatizes the
public law in four respects. One, it relegates dispute resolution to
private companies that are not subject to government oversight. 137
Two, arbitration agreements generally prohibit class actions. 13' As a
result, no matter how clearly illegal and injurious the company's
behavior, enforcement of the law to protect the public is crippled
because consumers can gain redress only one case at a time. Three,
arbitrators are not required to follow the law. Therefore, arbitrators
can ignore these laws and entirely undermine the goal of the public
nature of these laws. Four, arbitration operates in secret, hiding
illegal practices from the scrutiny of government agencies.
Consequently, those committing such practices are able to escape
enforcement by the agencies. This privatization of the law and
dispute resolution has substantially diluted the "public" law nature of
consumer protection law.
In order to ensure that consumer law continues to adequately
protect consumers, Congress should enact legislation to reduce the
threats posed by federalization. Congress can do this by prohibiting
federal agencies regulating financial institutions such as the OCC
from preempting state consumer protection laws that do not directly
interfere with federal law and do not significantly undermine the
institution's ability to operate in a safe and sound manner. In
addition, Congress should reduce the privatization of consumer law
by prohibiting mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts, as other countries have done. 139
laws where the public at large will be affected. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,
§2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). Jeffrey L. Roether, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA's Jurisdictional
Burden of Proof in Post-Removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745 (2007).
137. The lack of any government oversight is in sharp contrast to securities arbitration of investor
disputes. Marissa C. Marion, Preemption of the California Ethical Standards in Securities Arbitration:
Jevne v. Superior Court, 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 401,409 (2008) (explaining that the SEC must approve
all NASD arbitration procedures and regulations).
138. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse? 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
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A more far-reaching goal should be to upgrade consumer
protection law by making it consistent with the "emerging worldwide
consensus" that has resulted in statutes in many developed countries,
which guarantee substantially greater consumer protection than the
laws in the United States. 14 0 Strengthening American law would
serve two purposes. It would ameliorate the deleterious effect on
consumers of overreaching by business. In addition, it would greatly
simplify the ability of companies that do business with consumers
around the world who now encounter lawsuits when they apply U.S.
business practices in other countries.
14 1
140. This phrase reflects Professor Jennifer S. Martin's conclusion after reviewing the law of Sales in
many countries. Martin, supra note 60, at 226, 229; see also supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
141. See, e.g., Naylor & Ritter, supra note 133, describing litigation against AOL in France. See Winn
& Webber, supra note 4, at 222-25 (describing the AOL litigation and Dell Corporation's changes to its
contract terms to avoid a similar challenge).
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